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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

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OCA 87-5075
1 October 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: David D. Gries *DDG*
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: DCI/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Stokes and Ranking
Minority Member Hyde of the House Intelligence Committee

The meeting took place over breakfast on 1 October. The Director hosted. Also attending were the Deputy Director; Tom Latimer, Staff Director; Tom Smeeton, Minority Staff Director; and myself.

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Off-site Conference: The Director extended an invitation for the evening of 8 November to both Mr. Stokes and Mr. Hyde to attend the off-site conference of the Intelligence Community, [redacted] on 8 and 9 November. 25X1
Mr. Hyde said that he could attend on Monday morning, 9 November, provided he could find suitable transportation from Miami.
Mr. Stokes consulted what appeared to be his appointment book but made no comment. (I will follow up with both.)

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Sworn Testimony: The Director did not care greatly about being sworn because he always considered himself under oath when testifying before Congress. Others in the Intelligence Community felt differently, and the Director feared that, as a consequence,

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the level of candor which the Committee desired might be lost. Concern was running high in the Intelligence Community. Mr. Stokes appreciated the concern but explained that the Committee had expressed its own concerns when writing the letter about sworn testimony. These concerns grew out of situations where Agency witnesses displayed a lack of candor. Mr. Stokes agreed that swearing witnesses might not bring greater candor; however, the Committee was invoking Rule 4 as a way of saying that it had tried to induce candor without the oath, had failed, and now wanted to try to induce candor with the oath. Mr. Stokes hoped the problem of sworn testimony could be solved, and Mr. Hyde added his hope that the requirement would be levied sparingly.

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Arms Control: The Director raised our concern about inadvertently spreading knowledge of our arms control monitoring and verification capabilities, and both Mr. Stokes and Mr. Hyde agreed to help us confine briefings to the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence Committees. Mr. Hyde asked rhetorically whether the Committee should ask the Speaker for help.

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Satellite Systems: Disagreements have arisen between the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office concerning who has primacy in a particular satellite program, Mr. Stokes said. After commenting that the dispute had reached the Director level of both agencies, he asked the Director to intervene and solve the problem. The Deputy Director identified the problem as a "turf issue," said he was trying to straighten it out and described his plans to meet privately with General Odom and Secretary Aldridge to seek resolution. The outside panel organized to help solve the dispute had already made its report, but a solution still eluded us.

Embassy Security: Mr. Hyde expressed concern about embassy security, describing it as universally bad. He wondered whether the Department of State was competent to solve the problem. Did it have the will to do what needed to be done? Disclaiming detailed knowledge of the problem, he asked whether the Committee could help the Director in any way. The Director said he had similar concerns and had seen signs at State of trying to wiggle out of a tight spot by appearing conciliatory but perhaps without the will to finish the job. The intelligence community had studied the problem, the Director said, and had devised proposals for setting standards for property, people, and technical security. All three must march in tandem, for one weak link would undercut everything. The Director favored an independent unit appointed by the DCI and reporting not to State, but to an advisory board. The independent unit would be charged with setting standards for property, people and technical issues and then with monitoring compliance. The independent unit could withhold certification of an embassy if necessary. The Director and Secretary Schultz had written to the President directly, giving their views. In the main they agreed on solutions, but there were some areas of disagreement. Mr. Hyde urged the Director not to be influenced by the need for comity with the Secretary. The Deputy Director described his experience at hearings of the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee, at which Mr. Rogers had challenged the Agency's competence to learn what had been done to the embassy in Moscow and Mr. Smith had expressed uncertainty about solutions. Mr. Stokes said Mr. Smith had also expressed his concerns directly to him. It was concluded that there was value in presenting the House Intelligence Committee with a detailed briefing, perhaps with Mr. Smith in attendance. (House Division: please follow up.)

Woodward Book: Mr. Hyde asked whether the Agency was preparing an assessment of the damage. If so, could it be shared with the Committee? The Director said that it would take some time to prepare an assessment; we would be talking to the Committee about it as work went forth. Mr. Stokes believed the book would force the Committee to go over some areas again, 25X1
Hearings should be anticipated. 25X1
The Director noted the absence of sources for allegations made in the book.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

C

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

13

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied